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One week on after the EU Referendum  
David Wilson, Executive Director, International Public Policy Institute, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Much has been written about the surprise outcome of the EU Referendum on 23 June.  While 
it clearly represents a turning point in UK history, it is difficult to be certain about the immediate 
QH[WVWHSVRUWRVHHFOHDUO\ZKHUHZHJRQRZ$QGLQWU\LQJWRSURFHVVWKLVELJJHUSLFWXUHLW¶V
difficult to be objective on such an emotive and political issue.  Yet with the caveat about the 
lack of ³known knowns´ ± these are my reflections. 
2.   Short term implications 
We are clearly facing significant short term challenges.  The vote was a shock, and it will take 
time for an economic and political adjustment.  The economic impact will inevitably be in the 
mid-range between what Sir Mervyn King has described as the exaggerated claims of the 
5HPDLQVLGHDQGWKH³LWZRQ¶WEHVREDGDQGLWZLOOEHZRUWKLW´line of Vote Leave.  Nonetheless, 
the immediate economic shock is real. 
x The impact of the currency and stock markets has been in line with expectations.  The 
pound-dollar exchange rate is about 11% down.  The cost of government borrowing 
may not be affected that much, and the balance of payments outlook could improve.  
Inflation may pick-up ± but that appears manageable;  
x The impact will be felt where the economy is already deeply vulnerable - through further 
lowering investment.  This will lead to short term impact in lowering demand and long 
term problems for productivity growth; 
x Brian Ashcroft suggests1 that ³WKH short term negative effects will strengthen in 2017 
and possibly 2018, with the result that we should expect to see a sizeable slowing in 
growth compared to the pre-Brexit forecasts over the next two years.  A recession 
running for longer than two quarters is a distinct possibility´ 
x And business and people are already making choices, with early comments from the 
likes of Goldman Sachs, Vodafone and Siemens.  We should expect more uncertainty 
blighting investment. 
                                                          
1
 http://www.scottisheconomywatch.com/brian-ashcrofts-scottish/2016/06/brexit-and-the-
scottish-economy-dont-panic-but-do-worry.html 
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x And in an inter-connected world, the damage to others may be worse in the Eurozone 
than at home.  This is a very important point ± in EU, the UK¶s actions are seen as 
damaging them as much as us.  The bailout of the Italian banks is a case in point. 
The political adjustment will take time to find its level ± and will require a new narrative for both 
UK political parties.  The causes of the vote have been long in the making, and go much wider 
than the EU.  There are excellent articles by Chris Deerin2, Torsten Bell3, Tony Travers4 and 
Nick Pearce5.  And the academic work done by Will Jennings6 on the bifurcation of politics helps 
digest the challenge now facing the UK. 
The vote has led to a resignation of a Prime Minister, and has undermined the Cameron legacy.  
The position of the Leader of the Opposition is in doubt.  There have been renewed and vocal 
calls from EU far right parties, putting pressure on EU governments.  The critical player going 
forward will of course be Angela Merkel.  Alan Beattie7, writing in the Financial Times, argued 
WKDW$QJHOD0HUNHO¶Vcautious style of leadership could be a very positive influence ± but that 
she would have to ³LQVHUWKHUVHOIEHWZHHQWKHKRWKHDGVLQ%UXVVHOVDQGWKHIDWKHDGVLQ/RQGRQ´
NoticeablyWKHUHDUHVRPH³FRROKHDGV´LQ6FRWODQG± across the political spectrum. 
3.   Article 50 
Is the Referendum decisive and are Remainers in denial?  The Referendum was advisory and 
non-binding in law.  It does not in itself trigger a process to leave the EU.  But the vote appears 
binding in politics.  
The central issue facing a new Prime Minister is how and when to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty 
of Lisbon ± the legal process for a Member State to leave the European Union.  Article 50 
provides a step by step process and the framework within which the negotiating process and 
political debate can progress (see attachment).  While ultimately the outcome of any 
negotiations will depend on politics, the legal framework set out in Article 50 will create a 
negotiating playing field.  And the EU machine is very skilled at developing processes which 
deliver negotiating agreements (even if the parties to them dislike the outcome). 
It is important to recognise that Article 50 is not a re-run of Prime Minister &DPHURQ¶VQHJRWLDWLRQ 
process, nor does it require a ratification process at the end.  It starts the clock ticking toward a 
departure from the EU.  In fact, the design of Article 50 appears to tilt the playing field to the EU 
                                                          
2
 https://medium.com/@chrisdeerin/that-sinking-feeling-4559d45e8c0b#.t4u2aoh4l 
3
 http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/blog/the-referendum-living-standards-and-
inequality/ 
4
 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2016/06/28/the-shock-is-visceral-the-future-uncertain-deep-
seated-grievances-lie-behind-this-vote/ 
5
 http://blogs.bath.ac.uk/iprblog/2016/06/27/the-political-economy-of-brexit/ 
6
 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12228/pdf 
7
 https://next.ft.com/content/80418d42-3d1c-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0 
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side.  It arguably hands control to the EU to work out how to exit the UK, rather than give control 
to the UK on how it leaves.  It is worth working through the steps in Article 50:  
x Only the UK can decide whether to initiate Article 50 ± but it must have reasons for 
doing so.  ,QODZWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUFRXOGVLPSO\GHSOR\WKH³5R\DO3UHURJDWLYH´DQG
notify the EU Council RI WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V LQWHQWLRQWR OHDYHA minority view in 
legal circles is that an Act of Parliament will be required (and people will remember the 
extensive arguments about the need for a vote to go to war).  There are excellent 
discussions by David Allen Green8, Nick Barber9 and David Pannick10.  In politics, there 
will be arguments over whether an Election is required, or even a 2nd Referendum.  
There will be considerable debate over the next few months on what to do next in order 
to trigger Article 50.  But, in law, if the new Prime Minister is minded to, s/he could 
simply proceed under the Royal Prerogative to notify in September.  Article 50 (1) states 
³Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements´. 
x The UK must deliberately and formally start the process ± LWFDQ¶WLQDGYHUWHQWO\GR
it and nor can the EU do it.  The law says the following: Article 50 (2) ³A Member State 
which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention´. 
x The UK will negotiate with the EU Council, which votes by majority.  It would have 
been a conscious decision by the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty to enable a Member 
State to leave under a qualified majority.  In contrast, it takes a unanimous agreement 
under Article 49 for a new Member State to join.  The law says the following Article 50 
(2) That agreement shall be negotiated ..DQG«FRQFOXGHGRQEHKDOIRIWKH8QLRQE\
the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament.   
x There needs to be a deal within 2 years, unless there is a unanimous agreement 
to extend the process.  If no agreement, then the UK is ejected ± which is the worst 
of all options, probably for everyone but certainly for the UK.  Importantly, there is no 
legal provision for a second Referendum or a ratification process.  One could be 
negotiated, but only with the agreement of the EU ± see Phil Syrpis11.  .  Article 50 (3) 
states ³The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification 
««XQOHVVWKH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLO«unanimously decides to extend this period´ 
                                                          
8https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1200279093330132&id=137432829614
769 
9
 https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-
article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/ 
10
 http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-giving-notice-of-withdrawal-from-the-eu-requires-act-
of-parliament-dz7s85dmw?shareToken=bfb869ec671c090addc04b13bac1b328 
11
 https://theconversation.com/once-the-uk-triggers-article-50-to-start-brexit-can-it-turn-back-
61727 
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x It is a negotiation between the UK and the 27.  It is not a collaboration of the 28 
on how 1 leaves.  Article 50 (4) VWDWHV³«WKHZLWKGUDZLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHVKDOOnot 
participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions 
concerning it. 
The key point is that Article 50 is designed in such a way as to never be used and to tilt the 
negotiating table to favour the EU.  Triggering Article 50 potentially gives away any control the 
UK has left and is a major step.  Prime Minister &DPHURQ¶VUHVLJQDWLRQDWOHDVWUHFRJQLVHGWKDW
fact and passed that decision to others.  Because it is such a big step, it may of course never 
happen.  See the Guardian user comment12 and Martin Wolf13 
4.   7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶s future relationship with Europe 
Whatever the legal issues, the UK has decided ZKDWLWGRHVQ¶WZDQW.  But it has not yet decided 
what it does want.  What is the preferred model for the future relationship with the EU?  Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, or a new bespoke Association Treaty?  (see slide)  All are 
challenging.  Each has pros and cons.  None are easy.  See summary in the Financial Times14 
Expect to hear much talk about the 4 freedoms ± free movement of capital, labour, trade and 
services.  Any solution to restrict freedom of movement of labour is likely to be at a cost (to 
everyone) in terms of freedom of movement of something else ± probably trade.  While any 
likely solution will be bespoke for the UK - no country has really left before ± it is essential that 
the UK has a set of positions before it starts the process.  And of course the EU will have its 
own negotiating strategy ± see Martin Sandbu15 and reports of 6FKDXEOH¶V3ODQ16.  
There will be challenges and opportunities.  The University sector has raised concerns on EU 
funding and students.  The Financial sector are seeking reassurances on passporting and 
regulations.  The energy sector faces uncertainty over the energy single market and the 
environmental approach to climate change.  The agriculture and fisheries sector are facing 
profound changes ± even the Norway option, which is closest to the status quo, would mean 
significant repatriation of powers to the UK/Scotland.  The list could go on. 
7KH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VGLOHPPDLVEDODQFLQJWKHRYHUZKHOPLQJQHJRWLDWLQJ need to play it long 
against the short term economic consequences that are being created for everyone. 
 
                                                          
12
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/26/an-astute-online-
comment-has-many-wondering-whether-brexit-may-ever-happen/?tid=pm_pop_b 
13
 https://next.ft.com/content/eb481064-3c88-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0 
14
 https://next.ft.com/content/78413118-3959-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f 
15
 https://next.ft.com/content/c7ad42a6-3c46-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0 
16
 https://global.handelsblatt.com/edition/457/ressort/politics/article/schaubles-secret-brexit-
plan 
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5.   The Scottish question 
On a Scottish level, there is much that the Scottish Government can do to influence (and 
frustrate) the process.  Scotland voted substantially differently ± all local authority areas and by 
a clear majority.  Yet there was over 1m votes for Leave.  The headline is that within the UK 
constitutional issues are really prior issues before triggering Article 50, not issues to be dealt 
with later ± see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott17 .  For example: 
Does a majority in the Referendum in favour of Remain in Scotland actually mean 
anything legally?  
o No ± the Referendum was a UK franchise.  In as far as it was an advisory Referendum, 
it advised on the basis of the UK.   
o Yes ± it is hard to ignore such a clear outcome, and UK Government has already 
established a precedent on who speaks for Scotland by agreeing to the Independence 
Referendum.  :KLOHWKH8.*RYHUQPHQWUHMHFWHGWKH³1DWLRQV/RFN´DSSURDFKSXW
forward by the devolved governments, the legal and constitutional issues underlying 
the proposal have not been resolved.  The UK Parliament still has to come to terms 
with the fact that it has given away control not just to Brussels, but also de facto to 
devolved Parliaments. 
o On balance, yes the vote to Remain in Scotland matters very much 
Does Scottish Parliament have a say over Article 50?   
o No: EU matters are reserved under the Scotland Act.  Any role is at discretion of the 
UK government.   
o Yes:  The Scottish Parliament is bound up in EU legislation, and is responsible for 
delivering it.  It is responsible and accountable under EU law.  There is the Sewel 
Convention, and a Legislative Consent Motion will be essential to change Scottish 
Parliament laws.  Moreover, leaving EU will lead to significant changes in Scottish law.  
o On balance, imposing Brexit on the Scottish Parliament represents a major override of 
a democratic body.  Like the UK Parliament it would spend years redesigning legislation 
± see Francis FitzGibbon18.  But in UK law of course it could be done. 
Could Scottish Parliament stop Article 50 being triggered?   
o The First Minister was right to say that the Scottish Parliament would refuse to endorse 
any Legislative Consent Motion to trigger Article 50.  But she clearly recognises that 
there may be no such legislation, and in any case, the UK Government could simply 
                                                          
17
 https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/28/sionaidh-douglas-scott-brexit-the-referendum-
and-the-uk-parliament-some-questions-about-sovereignty/ 
18
 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n12/francis-fitzgibbon/if-we-leave 
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override what is a (Sewel) Convention anyway (they have done it before).  This is 
explained by Lindsay Stirton and Richard Kirkham19 and Mark Elliot20.   
o More exotically, there is a case that under Article 50 the term ³LWVRZQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
UHTXLUHPHQWV´may not be met.  Someone could make a case to frustrate the process.  
The UK and Northern Ireland Governments will need to consider the implications for 
the Good Friday Agreement.  Potentially even if UK government triggered it, that 
someone could seek judicial review action against the EU to stop them considering it.  
This may not get past a first legal hurdle, but it would create hurdles and potentially 
frustrate and delay the process. 
Choices facing Scotland 
But Scotland also needs to know what it wants.  Scotland now has an unenviable dilemma of 
choosing either UK or EU.  The most important points often go unsaid.  The UK has just decided 
narrowly to leave the EU.  In contrast, Scotland has decisively voted in 2 Referendums in under 
2 years to maintain its place in both the United Kingdom and the European Union.  Yet, that 
option ± the settled will of the Scottish people in both Referendums ± is no longer an option. 
The opinion polls, for what they are worth, point to a hardening of pro-Independence sentiment.  
But the choice potentially facing people in Scotland has not previously been tested, and it will 
take time to process such a major choice: 
x Many people living in Scotland - particularly in disadvantaged areas - protested against 
the establishment and the challenges of globalisation by voting Yes (against 
Westminster) and Leave (against the EU).  How will they decide if they choose between 
them ± there is a strong undercurrent of opposition to both in Scotland, which perhaps 
has not yet found its voice.  
x How will the prosperous liberal minded unionists who voted No, and then Remain, 
choose between them?   
6.   Are the England question and the Scottish questions resolvable?  
Is there a workable compromise which respects Scotland¶V DSSDUHQW ZLVK to remain and 
(QJODQG¶V to leave?  To be clear, the longest option would involve a sequential 3-step process; 
x The UK leaving the EU after a 2-3 year Article 50 process, followed by 
x Scotland leaving the UK, after an Indyref2, followed by  
x Scotland gaining accession to the EU under Article 49. 
                                                          
19
 http://vinculumjuris.net/2016/06/27/a-constitutional-solution-to-this-constitutional-crisis/ 
20
 https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/26/brexit-can-scotland-block-brexit/ 
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All of the current attention is on whether there are alternative models.  And there are some 
excellent summaries off the possible options, including by Merijn Chamon and Guillaume Van 
der Loo21, %UHQGDQ2¶/HDU\22, Jo Murkens23, Adam Ramsey24 and Tobias Lock25; 
x 7KHVRFDOOHG³Reverse *UHHQODQG´RSWLRQwhere parts of the UK could maintain 
membership and other parts of the UK were to leave the EU.  This would create a 
³YDULDEOHJHRPHWU\´RI(8PHPEHrship within the UK.  This model already exists in 
Denmark.  In that case, Denmark is a full Member State, but Greenland, which is part 
of Denmark, is not in the EU.  Clearly this model applies to a small part of a Member 
States, and not (as would be the case in the UK) the large part of one of the largest 
Member States including a world city of the status of London.   
x 7KH ³6FRWODQG VWD\V U8. OHDYHV´ RSWLRQ  Assuming political support, is there a 
model involving a simultaneous departure of England and Wales from the EU, 
independence for Scotland, and Scotland remaining in the EU.  There is no precedent 
for this, nor a legal process.  But it would appear that while Article 50 requires a majority 
RIWKH(8&RXQFLOWRDJUHHWKHWHUPVDQ\IRUPRI³6FRWODQGVWD\V´PRGHOPD\UHTXLUH
unanimous agreement (as is the case in Article 49 for new members). 
The Norway EEA model for all of the UK.  This is the approach suggested by Gordon Brown.  
It would involve the UK leaving the EU, with a future relationship built around the Norwegian 
model, albeit with some further bespoke restrictions on in-migration.  There is an excellent 
analysis of the existing Norwegian model by Benjamin Leruth26 ± see table attachment.  Mr 
%URZQ¶VDUJXPHQWZDVWKDWVXFKDPRGHOZRXOGJRVRPHZD\WRSUHVHUYLQJWUDGHEHWZHHQWKH
UK and Europe ± and that any model that has Scotland outwith the UK (even staying in Europe) 
would impact negatively on trade, reopen issues around the currency etc.   
These issues will dominate the debate, at least in Scotland.  And will no doubt be subject to the 
discussions which are underway between the Scottish Government and the EU Institutions.  But 
two things can be said with certainty: 
x A Scottish solution should EHRQHRIWKH8.¶Vnegotiating objectives.  This will be 
very challenging.  The economic, political and constitutional challenges facing the UK 
Government in managing its relations with the EU in the run-up to an Article 50 process 
are extraordinary.  7KHUHPD\ZHOOEHDYHU\VWURQJYLHZWKDWWKH8.¶VWHUULWRULDOLVVXHV
                                                          
21
 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/a-brexit-could-make-it-easier-for-scotland-to-join-the-
eu-as-an-independent-state/ 
22
 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2016/06/27/de-toxifying-the-uks-eu-exit-process-a-multi-
national-compromise-is-possible/ 
23
 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/06/27/scotland-or-northern-ireland-could-reject-
brexit/ 
24
 https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/adam-ramsay/reverse-greenland-letting-scotland-stay 
25
 http://verfassungsblog.de/a-european-future-for-scotland/ 
26
 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2015.1020840?journalCode=rjpp20 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
July 2016                                                                                                                                                     8 
are both a distraction and outside the scope of the Brexit project.  However, it is clear 
that, from a Scottish perspective, the only route to a successful outcome will require the 
UK Government to help negotiate a solution which meets Scottish needs.  While 
Scotland can create the circumstances to find a compromise solution, it cannot 
negotiate that without the active and engaged collaboration with the UK Government.   
x To achieve a constitutional change for Scotland, an independence referendum 
may be required soon, and potentially before triggering Article 50.  If Brexit has a 
political legitimacy, then to maintain a Scottish membership of the EU (especially if it 
involves independence) requires a similar degree of legitimacy.  That means a 
successful referendum sooner rather than later. ± a point astutely made by Kirsty 
Hughes27. 
7. In summary 
x We face extraordinary challenging times. 
x The new UK Prime Minister will have to manage the expectations on him/her WR³WDNH
EDFNFRQWURO´%XWVKHZLOOKDYHWRFRQVLGHUZKHWKHUWKH\DUHUHDOO\LQFRQWURORIWKH
levers and of events to take back control of law making powers.   
x The UK territorial issues, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, are prior issues, not issues 
for later 
x 7KH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VOHDGHUVKLSFKDOOHQJHLVWRPDQDJHDORQJGHOD\EHIRUH$UWLFOH
is triggered, if it is triggered at all, in order to create a coherent strategy going forward.  
This may require an Election or a second Referendum before Article 50, and/or a 
ratification process of some sort. 
x 0HDQWLPHWKH)LUVW0LQLVWHU¶VOHDGHUVKLSFKDOOHQJHLVWRPRELOLVHVXSSRUWIRURSWLRQVWR
maintain a Scottish membership of the EU, within or outwith the UK.  This may well 
require a Referendum soon. 
x Any bespoke Scottish solution would have to be negotiated by the Scottish Government 
and the UK Government. 
x The politics may well be to play it long, with a period of economic uncertainty. 
  
                                                          
27
 https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/kirsty-hughes/scotland-and-eu-post-brexit-independent-
scotland-in-eu-or-outside-with-uk 
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Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention.  In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.  That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.  It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of 
the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in 
paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend this period. 
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the 
Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of 
the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to 
the procedure referred to in Article 49. 
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7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VIXWXUH relationship with the EU 
The Norway Option 
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